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“Pearl Harbor in Reverse”
Moral Analogies in the Cuban Missile Crisis
✣ Dominic Tierney
[A] course of action where we strike without warning is like Pearl Harbor . . . It’s
. . . it’s the kind of conduct that’s such that one might expect of the Soviet
Union. It is not conduct that one expects of the United States.
George Ball, Thursday, 18 October 1962.
This article analyzes the role of the Pearl Harbor moral analogy in
the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. People draw moral analogies when they judge
the rights and wrongs of an act on the basis of parallels with previous actions
deemed to be moral or immoral. Such analogies are part of the broader class
of historical analogies. Whereas strategic historical analogies use past cases to
discern what is at stake in a situation and whether certain policies will be ef-
fective, moral historical analogies focus on the ethics of a decision. For exam-
ple, recent proponents of humanitarian intervention in Darfur regularly in-
voke the failure to halt genocide during World War II or in Rwanda in 1994.
In the ªrst presidential debate between John Kerry and George Bush in 2004,
Kerry stated that he would be willing to use military force in Sudan: “I’ll tell
you this, as president, if it took American forces to some degree to coalesce the
African Union, I’d be prepared to do it because we could never allow another
Rwanda. It’s the moral responsibility for us and the world.”1
1. “Transcript of the Candidates’ First Debate in the Presidential Campaign,” The New York Times,
1 October 2004, p. A20. At the groundbreaking for the U.S. Holocaust Museum, George H. W. Bush
told the audience, “Here we will learn that each of us bears responsibility for our actions and for our
failure to act. Here we will learn that we must intervene when we see evil arise.” Michael C. Desch,
“The Myth of Abandonment: The Use and Abuse of the Holocaust Analogy,” Security Studies, Vol. 15,
No. 1 (January–March 2006), p. 2. One reason for President Bill Clinton’s shift toward supporting the
use of air strikes against Serbia in the Yugoslav conºict may have been his attendance at the dedication
of the U.S. Holocaust Museum in April 1993, which according to one adviser left Clinton “very an-
guished.” See Douglas C. Foyle, “Public Opinion and Bosnia: Anticipating Disaster,” in Ralph G.
Journal of Cold War Studies
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During the Cuban missile crisis, a number of U.S. policymakers argued
against a surprise U.S. air strike against Soviet missile sites in Cuba because it
would be morally analogous to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941.
The use of this moral analogy in the Cuban missile crisis is important in at
least ªve respects.
First, ethical parallels with 1941 contributed signiªcantly to President
John F. Kennedy’s decision not to launch immediate air strikes against Cuba
and to proceed instead with a naval blockade of the island. The Pearl Harbor
moral analogy was a sufªcient condition for Kennedy to reject the option of
an air strike without prior warning to Moscow. Furthermore, by eliminating
the surprise attack option, the Pearl Harbor moral analogy removed the most
attractive air strike option in strategic terms and thereby pushed the adminis-
tration toward choosing the blockade.
Second, the moral analogy’s causal impact in 1962 is remarkable for sev-
eral reasons: ªrst, because it challenged one of the dominant postwar histori-
cal analogies—the Munich analogy—that suggested a tough response to ag-
gression; second, because a strong international norm against surprise attacks
did not yet exist; third, because policy toward Cuba was an arena in which the
Kennedy administration previously had displayed few moral qualms; fourth,
because the exigent circumstances of the missile crisis would lead one to ex-
pect that ethical concerns would have been secondary to strategic consider-
ations; and ªfth, because the proposed U.S. attack was not, in fact, morally
analogous to Pearl Harbor.
Third, although many historians of the Cuban missile crisis have noted
the use of the Pearl Harbor analogy, no previous studies have examined its role
in any detail.2 Fortunately, a major source has recently become available that
sheds light on this role. President Kennedy secretly taped many of the key
meetings during the crisis, enabling us to hear and assess the impact of the
analogy on the discussion and actors’ policy preferences.3 The tapes reveal a
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Carter, ed., Contemporary Cases in U.S. Foreign Policy: From Terrorism to Trade (Washington, DC: CQ
Inc., 2005), p. 9.
2. Many studies of the missile crisis weave references to the Pearl Harbor analogy into the narrative but
provide little reºection on its role in decision-making. Paul Anderson brieºy discussed the analogy in a
1981 article, although at the time only limited sources were available. Paul A. Anderson, “Justiªcat-
ions and Precedents as Constraints in Foreign Policy Decision-Making,” American Journal of Political
Science, Vol. 25, No. 4 (November 1981), pp. 738–761.
3. The tapes can be downloaded from www.whitehousetapes.org, a website run by the Miller Center
of Public Affairs at the University of Virginia. Ernest May and Philip Zelikow should be applauded for
their efforts to transcribe the tapes, initially published as Ernest R. May and Philip D. Zelikow, eds.,
The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House during the Cuban Missile Crisis (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1997), and then revised and republished in 2001 as Timothy Naftali, Ernest May,
and Philip Zelikow, eds., The Presidential Recordings, John F. Kennedy: The Great Crises, Vols. 2 and 3
(New York: W. W. Norton, 2001). However, their volumes, especially the 1997 edition, are marred by
story starkly at odds with early accounts of how the Pearl Harbor analogy fea-
tured in the crisis. The writings and memoirs of the former special counsel to
the president Theodore Sorensen and former Attorney General Robert F.
Kennedy suggest that Robert Kennedy was the one who introduced the anal-
ogy into the discussion as part of an ethical argument against air strikes.4 In
reality, Robert Kennedy was extremely hawkish at the start of the crisis. The
ofªcials who ªrst discussed the moral analogy were Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) Director John McCone and Under Secretary of State George
Ball. Robert Kennedy, far from having been the ªrst to champion the norma-
tive parallel, was himself deeply inºuenced by it as he changed from being a
hawk to a dove.
Fourth, the use of ethical parallels in the Cuban missile crisis offers in-
sights into wider foreign policymaking. Scholars previously have explored
how decision-makers employ historical analogies, but they have not focused
speciªcally on moral analogies.5 This neglect is unwarranted because moral
analogies have unique characteristics and can enable ethical concerns to fea-
ture suddenly and unexpectedly in decision-making. Moral analogies tend to
be employed by leaders with a propensity for moral rhetoric in regard to for-
mative experiences. The analogies have the greatest impact when referring to
conspicuously immoral behavior. The fact that moral analogies prospered in
the unfertile soil of the Cuban missile crisis deliberations provides signiªcant
evidence for their wider potential impact.6
Fifth, four decades after the Cuban missile crisis ended, analogies with
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important errors. The volumes should therefore be used in conjunction with Sheldon Stern’s interpre-
tive narrative, Averting the “Final Failure”: John F. Kennedy and the Secret Cuban Missile Crisis Meetings
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003). See also Sheldon M. Stern, “What JFK Really Said,”
The Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 285, No. 5 (May 2000), pp. 122–128; and Sheldon M. Stern, “Source Ma-
terial: The 1997 Published Transcripts of the JFK Cuban Missile Crisis Tapes: Too Good to Be True?”
Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol. 30, No. 3 (September 2000), pp. 586–593. I listened to all the rele-
vant material from the Kennedy tapes, but I cite from the above works where I consider the published
version to be an accurate rendition of what was said. In several cases I found errors in the published
transcript, as indicated in the relevant footnotes.
4. Theodore C. Sorensen, Kennedy (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), p. 684; Elie Abel, The Missile
Crisis (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1966); and Robert F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban
Missile Crisis (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1999).
5. Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of
1965 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992); Ernest R. May, “Lessons” of the Past: The Use
and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973); and Rich-
ard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May, Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision-Makers (New
York: The Free Press, 1986).
6. Harry Eckstein, “Case Study and Theory in Political Science,” in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W.
Polsby, eds., Strategies of Inquiry (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1975), pp. 79–137; and Alexander
L. George, “Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured Focused Compari-
son,” in Paul Gordon Lauren, ed., Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory and Policy (London:
Macmillan, 1979), pp. 43–68.
Pearl Harbor were reborn on both sides of the debate over the war in Iraq. In-
deed, the very phrase “Pearl Harbor in reverse” that was invoked to discredit
air strikes during the Cuban missile crisis, was again employed to question the
morality of a U.S. attack on Iraq. However, in comparison to the missile cri-
sis, the “Pearl Harbor in reverse” argument generated little traction in 2003.
The varying power of this moral analogy over time highlights the circum-
stances in which ethical parallels tend to be effective and ineffective.
The story of the Cuban missile crisis is well known. Soviet missile instal-
lations in Cuba were discovered on 15 October 1962, and President Kennedy
was briefed the following morning. The White House perceived the deploy-
ment as a major threat to national security and the U.S. position in the region
and assembled an executive committee (the “ExComm”) to deal with the cri-
sis. On Monday, 22 October, after nearly a week’s deliberations, Kennedy
publicly announced both the discovery of the missiles in Cuba and Washing-
ton’s imposition of a “quarantine” or blockade on shipments of offensive
weapons to the island. After a period of great tension, the crisis ended on 28
October when Nikita Khrushchev announced that he had ordered the weap-
ons dismantled and returned to the Soviet Union. The United States in return
pledged not to invade Cuba and secretly told Moscow that U.S. missiles in
Turkey would be removed within a few months.
This article begins with a brief theoretical examination of the role of mo-
rality, analogies, and moral analogies, in foreign policymaking. The article
then explores the impact of the “Pearl Harbor in reverse” argument in the Cu-
ban missile crisis, offering answers to four main questions:
(1)Whose moral concerns were actors in 1962 worried about?
(2)What was the causal impact of the historical analogy with Pearl Har-
bor?
(3)What does this case suggest about the wider use of moral analogies?
(4)Are scholars right to label the Pearl Harbor analogy an example of the
wise use of history?
Morality in Foreign Policy
Many theorists of international relations relegate moral concerns to a periph-
eral role in the formation of foreign policy. The realist tradition has focused
on the importance of anarchy in international politics, which necessitates the
pursuit of national interest deªned narrowly in terms of power. Hans
Morgenthau depicted moral concerns either as rhetorical justiªcation for
power political interests or, if genuine, as a form of dangerous “sentimental-
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ism” especially prevalent in the United States.7 Other scholars, however, have
argued that politics is inherently goal-oriented and that moral principles can
shape an actor’s objectives.8 Morality in international relations is evident, for
example, with widespread prohibitions on torture, colonialism, and unjust
aggression. Robert McElroy has argued that ethical concerns can shape for-
eign policy through a number of different “pathways”: (1) individual con-
science (leaders follow moral standards because they personally believe they are
right); (2) domestic public opinion (leaders fear the political consequences of
violating a widely held domestic norm); and (3) world opinion (leaders wish to
avoid the condemnation resulting from violation of a widely held interna-
tional norm).9
Morality does not always matter, particularly if the moral principle is am-
biguous. The bombing of Dresden in World War II indicates that ethical con-
cerns can erode over time. In this case, the norm against targeting civilians in
warfare was undermined by the belief that German civilians were directly or
indirectly contributing to the war effort and thus were, in a sense, “combat-
ants.” In contrast, the clear-cut nature of the norm against chemical warfare
has allowed for relatively few violations.10
The Norm against Surprise Attacks
Richard Betts has deªned a surprise attack as an assault against a target that is
not prepared for it because of mistaken estimates of whether, when, where,
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7. Hans Morgenthau, Politics among Nations (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956), p. 200; and Robert
W. McElroy, Morality and American Foreign Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992),
p. 23. Robert Art and Kenneth Waltz argue that “states in anarchy cannot afford to be moral. The pos-
sibility of moral behavior rests upon the existence of an effective government that can deter and pun-
ish illegal actions. . . . The preconditions for morality are absent in international politics. Every state,
as a consequence, has to be prepared to do what is necessary for its interests as it deªnes them.” See
Robert J. Art and Kenneth N. Waltz, “Technology, Strategy and the Uses of Force,” in Robert J. Art
and Kenneth N. Waltz, eds., The Use of Force: International Politics and Foreign Policy (Lanham, MD:
University Press of America, 1983), p. 6.
8. J. E. Hare and Carey Joynt, Ethics and International Affairs (London: Macmillan, 1982); Leslie H.
Gelb and Justine A. Rosenthal, “The Rise of Ethics in Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 82, No. 3
(May/June 2003), pp. 2–7. For the argument that states are often motivated by concerns about justice
as well as power, see David A. Welch, Justice and the Genesis of War (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1993). On U.S. morality during the Cold War, see John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the
End of the Cold War: Implications, Reconsiderations, Provocations (New York: Oxford University Press,
1992).
9. McElroy, Morality and American Foreign Policy, pp. 8–13, 39–53. On moral restraints, see also Nina
Tannenwald, The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Nonuse of Nuclear Weapons since 1945
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
10. McElroy, Morality and American Foreign Policy, pp. 176–177; and Ronald Schaffer, Wings of Judg-
ment: American Bombing in World War II (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985).
and how the enemy will strike.11 When participants in the ExComm discus-
sions used the phrase “Pearl Harbor in reverse,” they were at least implicitly
subscribing to the view that surprise attacks are inherently wrong. The norm
against surprise attacks featured to a remarkable extent in the 1962 Cuban
missile crisis, given the norm’s inherent ambiguity. The supposed immorality
of surprise attacks implies that states typically issue a warning before starting
hostilities, but after World War II countries largely abandoned the practice of
declaring war on each other. Moreover, surprise attacks are not necessarily
more likely than other attacks to violate the norm against targeting civilians or
the laws of war. Such assaults often use the beneªts of surprise to target mili-
tary or other directly threatening objectives rather than civilians.
Further ambiguity arises from the fact that surprise attacks rarely can be
clearly distinguished from non-surprise attacks. Ephraim Kam concluded that
“since 1939 there have been only a few cases in which [for the victim] the out-
break of war was not a surprise.”12 A U.S. air strike against Cuba in 1962
might have qualiªed as one of those rare instances when the defenders would
not have been surprised. Fidel Castro and Khrushchev considered a U.S. at-
tack quite likely given Washington’s earlier backing for the 1961 invasion of
Cuba by Cuban expatriates at the Bay of Pigs.13 Furthermore, a norm against
surprise attacks raises a number of moral and policy dilemmas. Are surprise
attacks unjust even if the cause is just? President Kennedy would have consid-
ered the overthrow of the Castro regime to be a moral good. What kind of
warning is necessary before ªghting a moral war? Can surprise not be consid-
ered an inherent part of warfare? When the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff (JCS), General Maxwell Taylor, ªrst heard about the missiles in Cuba,
he argued for the “great importance of getting a strike with all the beneªt of
surprise.”14
In any case, the Cuban missile crisis seems an unlikely occasion for the
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11. Richard K. Betts, Surprise Attack: Lessons for Defense Planning (Washington, DC: Brookings Insti-
tution, 1982), p. 11.
12. Ephraim Kam, Surprise Attack: A Victim’s Perspective (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
2004), p. 230.
13. In 1989, former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara argued that the Kennedy administration
had not intended to invade Cuba in 1962. Many scholars have contested this claim, and even
McNamara acknowledged that for an outside observer the evidence at the time, including U.S. mili-
tary exercises in the region, pointed strongly toward such an invasion. See Raymond L. Garthoff,
“Documenting the Cuban Missile Crisis,” Diplomatic History, Vol. 24, No. 2 (Spring 2000), p. 312;
Thomas C. Reeves, A Question of Character: A Life of John F. Kennedy (London: Bloomsbury, 1991),
p. 364; and James G. Hershberg, “Before ‘The Missiles of October’: Did Kennedy Plan a Military
Strike against Cuba?” in James A. Nathan, ed., The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited (New York: St. Mar-
tin’s Press, 1992), pp. 237–280.
14. Naftali, May, and Zelikow, eds., The Presidential Recordings, Vol. 2, p. 408.
Kennedy administration to have been guided by a moral inhibition against
surprise attacks. Ethical concerns had featured only to a limited extent in the
administration’s previous policies toward Cuba. In 1961, the president had
stated in a speech to Congress that “our arms will never be used to strike the
ªrst blow in any attack,” adding in his televised speech on 22 October 1962
regarding the Cuban missiles: “Our goal is not the victory of might, but the
vindication of right.”15 In reality, U.S. policy toward Cuba under Kennedy
had shown little sign of restraint because of moral concerns. Just three weeks
after the 1961 speech announcing that the United States would never strike
the ªrst blow, Kennedy supported a surprise attack by Cuban expatriates at
the Bay of Pigs (which turned into a debacle). The administration also carried
out subversion, psychological warfare, and assassination in Cuba—effectively
state terrorism.16 In U.S. policy toward Cuba, the ends (removing Castro)
usually justiªed the means.
Furthermore, the Cuban missile crisis is the type of foreign policy situa-
tion in which we would expect morality to be relatively unimportant. Robert
McElroy argued that moral concerns matter less in “the sphere of clear
and absolute state necessity,” especially when “the military or economic secu-
rity of a state would be genuinely endangered by compliance with an inter-
national moral norm.” McElroy also thought that morality would be less
likely to matter in “crisis situations” compared to “long term consultative
processes.”17
Analogies in Foreign Policy
The norm against surprise attacks had a powerful effect on U.S. deliberations
during the Cuban missile crisis because of the vividness of the analogy drawn
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15. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, “Special Message to the Congress on the Defense Bud-
get, 28 March 1961,” House Document 123, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 1961; and Stern, Averting the “Fi-
nal Failure,” p. 32.
16. On Tuesday, 16 October 1962—the ªrst day of the Cuban missile crisis—Attorney General Rob-
ert Kennedy called for a stepped-up program of sabotage on the island. The next day, President Ken-
nedy approved a series of subversive actions in Cuba, including a grenade attack on the Chinese em-
bassy in Havana. See Stern, Averting the “Final Failure,” p. 14 n.32; May and Zelikow, The Kennedy
Tapes, pp. 25, 77; James G. Blight and Peter Kornbluh, eds., Politics of Illusion: the Bay of Pigs Invasion
Reexamined (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998), pp. 59–132; Evan Thomas, Robert Kennedy: His
Life (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000), pp. 211–212; C. David Heymann, RFK: A Candid Biog-
raphy of Robert F. Kennedy (London: Penguin, 1998), p. 260; Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy
Naftali, “One Hell of a Gamble”: Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy 1958–1964 (New York: W. W.
Norton and Co., 1997), p. 228; and Don Bohning, The Castro Obsession: U.S. Covert Operations
against Cuba, 1959–1965 (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2005).
17. McElroy, Morality and American Foreign Policy, p. 42, 46, 183.
with the 1941 Japanese air strike against Pearl Harbor. Yuen Foong Khong
has deªned an analogy as “an inference that if two or more events separated in
time agree in one respect, then they may also agree in another.”18 One of the
primary debates about historical analogies is whether policymakers use them
as rhetorical tools to advocate positions that they reached for other reasons. In
other words, do analogies and the perceived lessons of history independently
determine how policymakers assess options? Some scholars have argued that
analogies are mostly used as post-hoc rationalizations.19 Khong, by contrast,
claims that leaders use analogies not only to justify policies but also to perfor-
m speciªc cognitive and information-processing tasks essential to political de-
cision-making. Analogies, in his view, enable an actor to deªne problems, to
understand the political stakes involved, to contemplate possible solutions, to
gauge the odds of success, to weigh moral concerns, and to grasp potential
dangers.20 Even when an analogy is being employed purely as a rhetorical de-
vice, the rhetoric can encourage other policymakers to internalize the analogy
and alter their preferences accordingly.
A wide range of historical analogies was used during the Cuban missile
crisis. On one occasion, General Curtis LeMay described President Kennedy’s
blockade policy as analogous to appeasement at Munich in 1938, a reference
that played on Kennedy’s sensitivity to the fact that his father, Joseph P. Ken-
nedy, had suffered political disgrace for his pro-appeasement stance in the
1930s.21 President Kennedy noted that a U.S. attack on Cuba might give the
Soviet Union an opportunity to take military action in Berlin, in the same
way that the USSR invaded Hungary in 1956 while the West’s attention was
focused on the Suez Crisis.22 Toward the end of the Cuban missile crisis, the
Kennedy brothers discussed how World War I had broken out through a se-
ries of actions with unintended consequences—a historical parallel they
clearly wished to avoid.23
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18. Khong, Analogies at War, pp. 6–7; and May, “Lessons” of the Past, p. ix.
19. Andrew J. Taylor and John T. Rourke, “Historical Analogies in the Congressional Foreign Policy
Process,” Journal of Politics, Vol. 57, No. 2 (May 1995), pp. 460–468.
20. Khong, Analogies at War, pp. 6–21. See also Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in Interna-
tional Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 217; David Patrick Houghton,
“The Role of Analogical Reasoning in Novel Foreign-Policy Situations,” British Journal of Political Sci-
ence, Vol. 26, No. 4 (October 1996), pp. 523–552; and David Patrick Houghton, “Analogical Rea-
soning and Policymaking: Where and When Is It Used?” Policy Sciences, Vol. 31, No. 3 (September
1998), pp. 151–176.
21. Stern, Averting the “Final Failure,” pp. 7, 123.
22. Ibid., pp. 121–122.
23. Thomas, Robert Kennedy, p. 211.
Pearl Harbor and U.S. Historical Memory
The most important historical analogy used during the Cuban missile crisis
was drawn between prospective U.S. air strikes and the Japanese assault on
Pearl Harbor. At approximately 8:00 a.m. on 7 December 1941, 353 Japanese
aircraft attacked the U.S. naval base on the island of Oahu, Hawaii. A total of
21 U.S. ships and nearly 350 aircraft were damaged or destroyed, and more
than 2,400 Americans were killed. Pearl Harbor was a shocking and unex-
pected attack on U.S. territory, and President Franklin Roosevelt used explic-
itly moralistic language to describe it, calling Pearl Harbor a “date which will
live in infamy” and an “unprovoked and dastardly attack.”24 Pearl Harbor
quickly gained iconic power as “a sometimes contradictory representation of
‘infamy,’ the obligations of national loyalty, the importance of military and
foreign policy vigilance, the Roosevelt administration’s ineptitude or deceit,
the unfair scapegoating of the military, and the need to commemorate the
courage of ordinary soldiers and sailors.”25 For many people, Pearl Harbor led
to a war neatly drawn along the lines of good and evil.26 At the same time, the
attack shattered the American isolationist movement and provided the impe-
tus for a global national security policy.
Pearl Harbor was the watershed event for the Kennedy generation—the
day that changed their lives. John F. Kennedy entered the U.S. Navy despite
poor health, and his subsequent heroism in the Paciªc War (together with the
public relations efforts of his father) made Kennedy famous back in the
United States. He developed a lifelong revulsion toward the death and de-
struction he had seen.27 Robert Kennedy, who was sixteen at the time of Pearl
Harbor, was among the many policymakers who never forgot the Japanese at-
tack.28 As Robert Jervis wrote: “Events that are seen ªrst-hand, that happen
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24. Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Speech to Congress,” 8 December 1941, in U.S. Department of State,
Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan: 1931–1941, Vol. II (Washington, DC: U.S. Government
Printing Ofªce, 1943), pp. 793–794 (hereinafter referred to as FRUS, with appropriate year and vol-
ume numbers).
25. Emily Rosenberg, A Date Which Will Live: Pearl Harbor in American Memory (Durham, NC:
Duke University Press, 2003), p. 6. For the debate over intelligence and Pearl Harbor, see ch. 1. On
the debate over Roosevelt’s responsibility for the attack and whether Pearl Harbor had been deliber-
ately provoked as a backdoor into World War II, see Robert Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and Ameri-
can Foreign Policy, 1932–1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 539–541; and
Rosenberg, A Date Which Will Live, ch. 2.
26. During the Cuban missile crisis, Secretary of State Dean Rusk claimed that Pearl Harbor had given
the United States a “clear conscience” to ªght World War II. See Naftali, May, and Zelikow, eds., The
Presidential Recordings, Vol. 2, pp. 521–523.
27. Stern, Averting the “Final Failure,” p. 35.
28. May and Zelikow, The Kennedy Tapes, p. 4; Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., Robert Kennedy and his
Times (Boston: Houghton Mifºin, 1978), p. 41.
early in a person’s adult life, and that affect him and his country have great
impact on his later perceptual predispositions.”29 Ernest May and Philip
Zelikow suggest that Pearl Harbor had a pervasive presence during the Cuban
missile crisis, causing decision-makers to fear that the Soviet Union might
launch a surprise attack with nearby MRBMs.30
The Pearl Harbor analogy was also invoked in October 1962 to argue
against a surprise U.S. air strike on Cuba. The ExComm participants did not
carefully reºect on the ethics of Japanese actions in 1941. After all, the Pearl
Harbor attack did not target civilians or necessarily violate the laws of war.
Pearl Harbor did contravene the norm of declaring war before initiating hos-
tilities, although the limited salience of this norm even before World War II is
indicated by the lack of protests when Japan launched a surprise attack against
Tsarist Russia in 1904.31 Moreover, Pearl Harbor was not intended to be a
complete surprise attack. Tokyo had planned to break off relations with the
United States thirty minutes before striking Pearl Harbor, but logistical prob-
lems caused the message to be delivered several hours after the attack had be-
gun.
Despite a degree of ethical complexity, Pearl Harbor came to be perceived
as a clear-cut evil act, with disingenuous Japanese diplomacy followed by a
devastating attack against the innocent United States. Roosevelt remarked in
his speech the day after Pearl Harbor: “Always will we remember the character
of the onslaught against us.”32 Pearl Harbor engendered many historical “les-
sons” and memories, but “infamy” was chief among them. The U.S. govern-
ment and media quickly developed the slogan “Remember Pearl Harbor!” as a
latter day equivalent of “Remember the Maine!”33
Moral Analogies in Foreign Policy
One of the main reasons that decision-makers rely on moral analogical think-
ing is that it enables them to go beyond the immediately available normative
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29. Jervis, Perception and Misperception, p. 281.
30. May and Zelikow, The Kennedy Tapes, p. 4; Naftali, May, and Zelikow, eds., The Presidential Re-
cordings, Vol. 3, p. 149. During the crisis, Robert Kennedy sent journalist Charles Bartlett to see
Georgi Bolshakov, a Soviet intelligence ofªcer in Washington, DC. Bartlett told Bolshakov that the
President “is very angry about what has happened in Cuba. It reminds him of the Japanese deception
before Pearl Harbor.” See Fursenko and Naftali, “One Hell of a Gamble,” p. 251.
31. Although the 1904 attack was not widely condemned, it was still remembered. In 1941 the United
States considered a surprise attack by Japan as a likely way for hostilities to begin—in light of the 1904
parallel—although few thought that the target would be Pearl Harbor.
32. Rosenberg, A Date Which Will Live, p. 12.
33. Ibid, p. 16.
information. Decision-making often involves complex and competing ethical
claims. Leaders may be tempted to reach clear moral judgments about policy
options by thinking about past decisions that are judged to have been right or
wrong. In other words, moral analogies provide the perception of ethical cer-
tainty in an uncertain moral world.
Moral analogies are most likely to be invoked in countries that have a tra-
dition of moral rhetoric in foreign policy and of reasoning by historical paral-
lel. Leaders in the United States readily use moral language in foreign policy
statements. The use of historical analogies is part of the U.S. “national
style.”34 At the individual level, a number of variables increase the likelihood
that moral analogies will be employed, notably if the early adulthood of an in-
dividual coincides with a salient moral event such as Pearl Harbor, if the indi-
vidual tends toward moralistic thought, and if the individual has knowledge
of and interest in history.35
Moral analogies are an intellectual device that gives normative concerns
an unusual degree of signiªcance in policymaking. They bring to center-stage
ethical issues that otherwise might not be explicitly present in the policy-
making process. Moral analogies fuse a general moral lesson (“surprise attacks
are wrong”) with a speciªc and salient example (the Japanese attack in 1941).
The general behavior (surprise attacks) becomes associated with memories of
the particular case (the brutal nature of the Japanese war effort), so that sur-
prise attacks and Japanese behavior become fused in the mind as collectively
immoral. By invoking an analogy, a policymaker can take an ambiguous
moral concept such as “surprise attacks are wrong” and considerably enhance
its salience and its impact on decision-making.
When will moral analogies be most effective in altering beliefs? Five main
variables are apt to determine the efªcacy of moral analogies: (1) the ambigu-
ity of the underlying moral claim (a moral analogy about chemical warfare
will be more effective than one about bombing civilians); (2) the similarity be-
tween the cases (the more comparable the events, the more relevant the anal-
ogy);36 (3) the foreign policy scenario (moral analogies will be less effective in
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crisis situations involving core national interests); (4) the salience of the histor-
ical case (the most effective moral analogies refer to striking cases that are typ-
ically viewed in black-and-white moral terms, such as the Holocaust, Pearl
Harbor, and September 11); and (5) whether the past event is rightful or
wrongful (parallels are more effective when they concern historical wrongful
acts—it is easier to argue that past behavior was morally wrong than to claim
that it was morally right).37
The Cuban Missile Crisis
Caution is needed when assessing the role of moral analogies in the Cuban
missile crisis or indeed in foreign policy more generally. References to analo-
gies and to moral concerns can be purely rhetorical devices to build support
for policies adopted for other reasons. To distinguish analogies used in a rhe-
torical fashion from analogies that actually shaped an actor’s policy prefer-
ences, we need to consider whether historical parallels were used consistently
and coherently both in public and in private. We also need to bear in mind
that moral and analogical arguments can sometimes shape policymaking im-
plicitly. Even when decision-makers did not raise the Munich analogy directly
in October 1962, they had internalized the “lesson” that concessions to ag-
gressive dictators would merely invite further aggression.
The discussion here is not intended to give the false impression that the
1941 attack was the sole factor in the minds of the ExComm participants.
The dozen or so occasions when Pearl Harbor was mentioned were spread out
over a week of the crisis. The moral analogy with Pearl Harbor was by no
means the only variable at work in 1962, but it did prove to be of great
signiªcance; it was sufªcient to eliminate the option of a surprise attack and
thereby push the administration toward enacting a blockade. The Kennedy
tapes allow us to determine precisely when and for whom the Pearl Harbor
analogy mattered, how it shaped the discussion, and in what ways it solidiªed
opinion for and against particular policy options.
The Pearl Harbor analogy was used in three different ways during the cri-
sis. First, it was employed largely as a rhetorical device to warn about the
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blance to the Japanese attack and therefore suggested the historical parallel, whereas the Bay of Pigs in-
vasion did not.
37. Failing to intervene to stop genocide is more clearly wrong than any particular intervention to stop
genocide is clearly right. Once we examine speciªc “moral” actions in international affairs, the norma-
tive clarity starts to blur, and we tend to question the motives of the actors involved. Furthermore, an
analogy drawn with historical positive moral behavior has the burden of proposing a series of active
measures for decision-makers today. In contrast, analogies with immoral acts tell a decision-maker
what to avoid. Criticizing a policy choice is usually easier than upholding one. Therefore, moral analo-
gies tend to be more effective at eliminating rather than supporting policy options.
likely strategic repercussions of an air attack on Cuba. Second, the parallel
with 1941 was invoked as a moral analogy, representing both a rhetorical tool
to win support in the ExComm and an intellectual device that independently
shaped policymakers’ opinions. Third, references to Pearl Harbor served as a
rhetorical tool to explain the administration’s policy to Congress and the
American public.
Initially, however, none of these uses of the analogy was evident. During
the ªrst meeting of the ExComm, on the morning of Tuesday, 16 October,
moral debate was largely absent. Instead, the participants broadly agreed that
the Soviet missiles in Cuba would have to be removed either by an air strike or
by an invasion. Ofªcials put forth strong arguments for a sudden air strike
that would destroy the missiles before they became operational. Any warning
before an American attack, even to U.S. allies, would pose major risks. Secre-
tary of the Treasury C. Douglas Dillon averred that a warning might escalate
the situation if it induced the Soviet Union to take a tough stand. National
Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy stressed that a warning would produce di-
visions among America’s allies. President Kennedy commented that “warning
[U.S. allies], it seems to me, is warning everybody. And obviously you can’t
sort of announce that in four days from now you’re gonna take them out.
They may announce within three days that they’re gonna have [nuclear] war-
heads on ‘em. If we come and attack, they’re gonna ªre them. Then what . . .
whadda we do?”38
During this initial meeting, Robert Kennedy displayed no moral con-
cerns about a surprise air strike against Cuba. Indeed, he was a leading propo-
nent of the invasion option. His hawkish stance reºected his shock at the So-
viet Union’s secret deployment of missiles and was in keeping with his
previous hardline positions on Cuba. In Robert Kennedy’s mind, any attack
was risky, and an immediate invasion would minimize the risks by providing a
deªnitive solution to the Cuban problem. The ªrst ExComm meeting ended
with a broad consensus in favor of surprise air strikes at least against the mis-
sile sites. President Kennedy noted that the United States would “certainly”
take out the missiles—the only question was whether to broaden the attack.39
At the second ExComm meeting, later that evening, the president con-
sidered publicly announcing the discovery of the missiles 24 hours before the
strikes began. General Taylor, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara,
Dillon, and Bundy all criticized the efªcacy of a warning. Under Secretary of
State George Ball thought that a few hours notice would be useful for rela-
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tions with U.S. allies, but “more for the appearance than for the reality.” Rob-
ert Kennedy was still bellicose, suggesting that the United States should in-
vade Cuba: “just get into it, and get it over with.” He raised the possibility of
creating a pretext for an invasion by “getting involved in this through Guan-
tánamo Bay or something. Or whether there’s some ship that . . . you know,
sink the Maine again or something.” Clearly, for him and for the ExComm
more generally, moral considerations were at this stage peripheral at best.40
After the second ExComm meeting had formally ended and the presi-
dent had left, the discussion continued. Deputy CIA Director General Mar-
shall Carter used the analogy with Pearl Harbor in its ªrst sense—as a warn-
ing about unintended escalation. The participants began to discuss a possible
blockade strategy, but Ball was critical, seeing a blockade as “a greater involve-
ment almost than a military action.” Carter, however, was leaning toward the
blockade, and argued: “this comin’ in there on Pearl Harbor [with a surprise
attack] just frightens the hell out of me as to what goes beyond.” Bundy was
confused by this comment and asked: “beyond what?” Carter replied: “You go
in there with a surprise attack; you put out all the missiles. This isn’t the end;
this is the beginning, I think.” Thus, when the Pearl Harbor analogy was ini-
tially drawn, it was largely used as a rhetorical device to suggest the escalatory
potential of air strikes. The Japanese attack had inºamed the United States
and led to almost four years of war. Carter’s analogy helped to establish the
growing feeling that military action in Cuba might have unexpected and
costly consequences.41
Carter’s boss at the CIA, John McCone, was the one who ªrst used the
analogy with Pearl Harbor in its second incarnation—as an ethical parallel—
when he met President Kennedy the next morning, 17 October. From this
point on, the moral analogy was the dominant reference to Pearl Harbor. The
ethics of Pearl Harbor were not discussed in a sophisticated manner. Rather,
the Japanese attack was viewed as the epitome of wrongful behavior, and asso-
ciation with it was a powerful taboo. Although the analogy was certainly em-
ployed as a rhetorical device, it also inºuenced policymakers’ beliefs, helping
them to make sense of a complex situation under great time pressure. In a
memorandum, which McCone carried with him at the discussion, the CIA
director challenged the apparent consensus in favor of a sudden air strike. The
missiles must be removed, he said. “However, the United States should not act
without warning and thus be forced to live with a ‘Pearl Harbor indictment’
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for the indeªnite future.” McCone wanted an ultimatum issued to Moscow
threatening air strikes within 24 hours if the missiles were not dismantled.42
According to Theodore Sorensen, the moral analogy came up again later
that day when former Secretary of State Dean Acheson was arguing for a mili-
tary attack on Cuba without delay. In Sorensen’s telling, Robert Kennedy
handed Sorensen a note, the purported content of which has often been cited:
“I now know how Tojo felt when he was planning Pearl Harbor.” Sorensen
also claims that Robert Kennedy then told Acheson that “my brother is not
going to be the Tojo of the 60s” and suggested that a surprise U.S. air strike
would be “a Pearl Harbor in reverse, and it would blacken the name of the
United States in the pages of history.” The lack of any documentary evidence
for this conversation means that extreme caution (and indeed skepticism) is
required. The alleged note has never been found, and the exchange reported
by Sorensen does not appear in the transcript of the ExComm meeting.
Sorensen’s account of the crisis, and Elie Abel’s book The Missile Crisis (pub-
lished in 1966, a year after Soresen’s account appeared), are the only sources
for the anecdote.43 Because Robert Kennedy initially was vehemently in sup-
port of an immediate invasion of Cuba and saw a blockade, by contrast, as “a
very slow death,” one can reasonably conclude that Sorensen in his post-hoc
account (written at a time when the administration’s handling of the missile
crisis was regarded as a great success and when Robert Kennedy was already
beginning to contemplate a run for the presidency) signiªcantly embellished
Robert Kennedy’s moral conversion at that stage.44
We do, however, have substantiation for George Ball’s “Pearl Harbor”
memorandum, which he wrote on Wednesday evening, opposing air strikes
and favoring a blockade. Ball drew a clear moral analogy with 1941, noting
that “we tried Japanese as war criminals because of the sneak attack on Pearl
Harbor.” If a surprise attack were carried out against Cuba, Ball argued, then
far from establishing our moral strength . . . [the United States] . . . would, in
fact, alienate a great part of the civilized world by behaving in a manner wholly
contrary to our traditions, by pursuing a course of action that would cut directly
athwart everything we have stood for during our national history, and condemn
us as hypocrites in the opinion of the world.45
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The Pearl Harbor moral analogy played a major role in the discussions on
Thursday, 18 October. On Thursday morning, Sorensen told Kennedy that
“two big questions must be answered.” First, what kind of military response
would be adopted? Second, would a warning be issued to Khrushchev before
any attack?46 By the end of the day, the ªrst question had still not been settled,
although opinion had shifted toward a blockade. On the second question, the
president abandoned his initial view and at this point favored issuing a warn-
ing before any air strike began—in large part because of the analogy with
Pearl Harbor.
At the ExComm meeting that day, Rusk noted the military advantages of
a “quick strike” but also suggested (without mentioning Pearl Harbor) that
prior notiªcation to Khrushchev would legitimize a U.S. military response
and retain the support of allies. In response, the president echoed some of his
earlier fears about what Khrushchev might do in the period between any
warning and the initiation of air strikes. Kennedy speculated that the Soviet
Union might try to hide the missiles in the Cuban woods. He became more
interested in a warning when McNamara indicated that the United States
could probably keep track of the missiles. But the president worried that
Khrushchev’s response to a warning about air strikes would be to announce
his own ultimatum: “If you [attack the Soviet missiles], we’re going to take
Berlin.”47
Ball then argued that a surprise attack would create a “sense of affront” in
allied countries unless Khrushchev was given a way out—a 24-hour warning
before air strikes began.
Even though it may be illusory, I think we still have to do it, because I think that
the impact on [world] opinion and the reaction would be very much different. I
think that a course of action where we strike without warning is like Pearl Har-
bor. . . . It’s . . . it’s the kind of conduct that’s such that one might expect of the
Soviet Union. It is not conduct that one expects of the United States.
This statement marked a turning point in the conversation. Before Ball men-
tioned Pearl Harbor, President Kennedy had been noncommittal on the issue
of a warning and raised a series of possible objections to this course of action.
But after Ball spoke, Kennedy favored issuing an announcement to Khrush-
chev before any air strikes began. The president challenged his own earlier ar-
gument that giving notice to Khrushchev would threaten Berlin: “The point
is . . . [Khrushchev’s] . . . going to grab Berlin anyway”—warning or no warn-
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ing.48 If one listens to the tapes, Kennedy’s sympathy with Ball’s argument is
obvious.
Having come to oppose a surprise attack, the president outlined a possi-
ble plan. He could publicly announce the discovery of the missiles on Friday,
the 19th, and issue a warning before proceeding with air strikes on the 20th:
“So everybody knows about it. It isn’t Pearl Harbor in that sense. We’ve told
everybody. Then we go ahead Saturday and take [the missiles] out.” Pearl
Harbor was clearly uppermost in President Kennedy’s mind. When General
Taylor suggested attacking on Sunday, 21 October, Kennedy replied wryly
that: “Sunday has historic disadvantages”—a reference to Sunday, 7 Decem-
ber 1941. The president admitted that “the only advantage” of a warning
would be to maintain alliance “solidarity.” Although he still believed that issu-
ing a warning would be militarily risky and might allow Khrushchev to out-
maneuver them, he stressed that notiªcation to Khrushchev “wouldn’t put us
quite in the position of almost acting in such a bad way.”49
Once the president accepted the Pearl Harbor moral analogy, it also
found favor with Robert Kennedy. Maxwell Taylor later recalled that until the
discussion of Pearl Harbor arose, Robert Kennedy “had been a hawk con-
stantly.” Struck by Ball’s reference to the Japanese attack in 1941, and proba-
bly also taking his cue from his brother’s changing preferences, Robert Ken-
nedy suddenly abandoned his belligerent stance: “I think George Ball has a
hell of a good point . . . assuming that you do survive all this . . . [a warning
would afªrm] . . . what kind of country we are.” Dean Rusk added a Biblical
reference, stating that a warning would be preferable to “carrying the mark of
Cain on your brow for the rest of your lives.” Robert Kennedy argued that the
United States had been trying over the past ªfteen years to prevent a ªrst
strike by the Soviet Union and that attacking a small country without warn-
ing would therefore be incongruous: “I think it’s a hell of a burden to carry.”
President Kennedy agreed that although the United States would lose the ad-
vantage of surprise, a warning would give Khrushchev a chance to get Soviet
personnel out of the ªring line.50
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As the meeting drew to a close, McNamara summarized “the only two
courses of action that we are talking about”: (1) a blockade; or (2) air strikes
after a warning to Khrushchev. The surprise attack option, which only re-
cently had been the consensus approach, had been eliminated. Sorensen re-
marked to Kennedy that “there has been general though not unanimous
agreement that you are likely to be making some kind of representation to
Khrushchev ahead of time, maybe very shortly ahead of time.” The president
replied: “Yes. Well, we have to have . . . certainly to [contact] Khrushchev. We
have to decide how much time in advance [of the attack] we’d do it or
whether I would make [a] public statement.”51 Overall, by the end of the
meeting the general tone was considerably more cautious. The discussion
reºected a greater sense of the need for restraint. Ofªcials pointed out that air
strikes might not destroy all the missiles and could even provoke a crash effort
to launch the surviving MRBMs. They also warned that in the event of a sur-
prise attack the Soviet Union might respond elsewhere, and the United States
would achieve global infamy.
After the meeting, Acheson met with President Kennedy and urged im-
mediate surgical air strikes. The president countered that this action would be
“Pearl Harbor in reverse.” Acheson called the analogy “silly,” and in a refer-
ence to Robert Kennedy and Ball, Acheson remarked: “I know where you got
that. . . . It is unworthy of you to talk that way.” The former secretary of state
chided John Kennedy for repeating “his brother’s clichés.”52
On Friday, 19 October, the JCS and Dean Acheson set out the case for
swift air strikes, although they accepted that the “political disabilities” of this
option might require some sort of warning to maintain alliance cohesion. In
response, with the president absent, Robert Kennedy paced the room, arguing
that he now supported a blockade. Earlier that morning, during discussions at
the State Department, Robert Kennedy was still toying with the idea of an at-
tack, but now he was ªrmly against this course of action.53 According to
Ralph Meeker, who wrote the minutes,
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[Robert Kennedy] thought it would be very, very difªcult indeed for the Presi-
dent if the decision were to be for an air-strike, with all the memory of Pearl
Harbor and with all the implications this would have for us in whatever world
there would be afterward. For 175 years we had not been that kind of country. A
sneak attack was not in our traditions.
Although Robert Kennedy stressed that the administration had to deal with
the Soviet threat right away, he wanted to gain the support of the Organiza-
tion of American States and to give Khrushchev an opportunity to pull back.
A surprise attack, he insisted, would be unacceptable. Douglas Dillon later
claimed that he had been convinced by Robert Kennedy’s speech—indeed he
thought the whole ExComm had been persuaded by it, with a couple of ex-
ceptions.54 The reality, however, was not quite that simple.
On Saturday, 20 October, the tenor of the discussions initially shifted in
a more hawkish direction. The president worried that the missile threat would
increase each day, and he again broached the possibility of air strikes, albeit
with a few hours’ notice so that Soviet personnel could leave the vicinity. His
brother supported a mixture of blockade followed by air strikes to avoid a
Pearl Harbor-style attack. The president himself ªnally swung around in sup-
port of the blockade, which despite some difªculties would buy time and
keep more options open. A CIA report also suggested that eight nuclear mis-
siles in Cuba might already be operational, raising the stakes for any U.S.
strike. Secretary of State Rusk immediately agreed with the president—a sud-
den attack had no support in law or morality and therefore had to be ruled
out.55
By the time the ExComm met on Monday, 22 October, in the ªnal hours
before President Kennedy publicly announced the U.S. response, Robert
Kennedy was even more strongly opposed to immediate air strikes. He indi-
cated on Sunday to the president that such a move “would be a Pearl Harbor
type of attack” and would provoke an unpredictable response from Moscow,
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with the possibility of escalation to nuclear war. A blockade would avoid these
problems and leave more options open. Robert Kennedy privately noted that
the two main reasons the United States had decided against a surprise attack
were, ªrst, Pearl Harbor, and second, doubts about destroying all the missiles:
“Recognize military problems giving warning [before any air strikes], but
Pearl Harbor would have been such a shock that busted alliance.” The presi-
dent afªrmed that he had given up the idea of a quick strike the previous
morning: “it looked like we would have all the difªculties of Pearl Harbor and
not have ªnished the job.” These difªculties would include a “nearly fatal”
shock to the Western alliance.56 Later, when President Kennedy talked to
members of Congress, he asserted that he had chosen a blockade because he
could not be sure of destroying all the missiles: “you would do the Pearl Har-
bor attack and you’d only get half.”57
The Pearl Harbor analogy was used that same day in a third sense: as a
factor to emphasize when explaining the administration’s policy to Congress
and the American public. According to Robert Kennedy, the administration
could argue that air strikes were “just not considered on the basis of the fact
that we couldn’t have the Pearl Harbor kind of operation, rather than go into
all the details of why it would not” be practical. Rusk suggested saying that
the bombing was “not done” rather than “not considered,” which the presi-
dent agreed was “fair enough.”58
Not everyone at the ExComm meeting used the Pearl Harbor analogy,
however. Adlai Stevenson favored a negotiated settlement from the start but
did not base his position on moral concerns about a surprise attack. Rather,
he stressed the risk of starting a world war.59 Dean Acheson was harshly criti-
cal about the relevance of moral analogies with Pearl Harbor. In 1969,
Acheson summarized his thinking:
[A]t Pearl Harbor the Japanese without provocation or warning attacked our
ºeet thousands of miles from their shores. In the present situation, the Soviet
Union had installed ninety miles from our coast—while denying they were do-
ing so—offensive weapons that were capable of lethal injury to the United
States. This they were doing a hundred and forty years after the warning given in
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[the Monroe Doctrine]. . . . How much warning was necessary to avoid the
stigma of “Pearl Harbor in reverse”?60
Despite the frequent invocation of Pearl Harbor during the discussions from
16 to 22 October, the moral analogy (and most other historical analogies)
suddenly disappeared from the ExComm deliberations. Having focused in-
tensely on the crisis for more than a week, the ExComm members came to re-
gard the situation as largely unique and felt less need to search for historical
reference points.61
Robert Kennedy later wrote a memoir of the crisis, Thirteen Days, pub-
lished posthumously in 1968. The book was written with the help of Theo-
dore Sorensen as part of Kennedy’s election campaign, and its depiction of the
role of the Pearl Harbor analogy in the Cuban missile crisis is often at stark
odds with the record in the Kennedy tapes. The book claims that on the ªrst
day of the crisis the Attorney General gave President Kennedy a note about
potential U.S. air strikes: “I now know how Tojo felt when he was planning
Pearl Harbor.”62 Robert Kennedy then supposedly backed McNamara’s pro-
posal for a blockade, overruling the Joint Chiefs’ preference for air strikes.
Thirteen Days then reports that when Dean Acheson pressed for air strikes,
Robert Kennedy rebuffed him:
Whatever validity the military and political arguments were for an attack in
preference to a blockade, America’s traditions and history would not permit such
a course of action. Whatever military reasons [Dean Acheson and others] could
marshal, they were nevertheless, in the last analysis, advocating a surprise attack
by a very large nation against a very small one. This, I said, could not be under-
taken by the U.S. if we were to maintain our moral position at home and around
the globe. Our struggle against Communism throughout the world was far more
than physical survival—it had as its essence our heritage and our ideals, and
these we must not destroy.63
The tape recordings of the ExComm meetings underscore how fanciful this
depiction is. In reality, Robert Kennedy at the start of the crisis was bellicose
and confrontational—strikingly different on occasion from the romanticized
image in Thirteen Days.
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Forty years later, the Pearl Harbor analogy was revived in the debates over
the U.S. response to the September 2001 terrorist attacks, preemptive or pre-
ventive war, and the decision to invade Iraq. For many Americans, the attacks
on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon seemed to parallel Pearl Harbor,
notably the element of surprise and the intelligence failure.64 On the evening
of 11 September, President George W. Bush wrote in his diary: “the Pearl
Harbor of the 21st century took place today.”65 The Bush administration in-
voked Pearl Harbor to argue for an offensive strategy against terrorists and ty-
rants—a strategy that would require the United States to act preemptively or
even preventively.66 On the anniversary of Pearl Harbor on 7 December 2001,
Bush commented: “What happened at Pearl Harbor was the start of a long
and terrible war for America. Yet out of that surprise attack grew a steadfast
resolve that made America freedom’s defender.” Drawing a parallel with his
own proclaimed war on terrorism, Bush remarked: “The terrorists are the
heirs to fascism. . . . Like all fascists the terrorists cannot be appeased; they
must be defeated.”67
Whereas the Bush administration drew a parallel between the terrorists
and the fascists of World War II, opponents of the 2003 war in Iraq some-
times likened the United States to the Japanese in 1941. The Pearl Harbor
moral analogy was used by critics of the Bush administration to suggest that a
preventive attack would be as morally wrong for Washington in 2003 as it
had been for Tokyo in 1941. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., who had been an adviser
to President Kennedy, made precisely this point when voicing his opposition
to the Iraq War:
Preventive war, anticipatory self-defense, was the doctrine with which the Japa-
nese justiªed Pearl Harbor. FDR, an earlier American president, said that it was
a date that will live in infamy. And now the Bush doctrine is a doctrine of pre-
ventive war, which makes America the self-appointed world’s judge, jury and ex-
ecutioner.
Such attacks, Schlesinger claimed, would be “Pearl Harbor in reverse.”68 Simi-
larly, Senator Edward Kennedy in 2002 noted Robert Kennedy’s use of the
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Pearl Harbor moral analogy in 1962: “Earlier generations of Americans re-
jected preventive war on the grounds of both morality and practicality, and
our generation must do so as well.”69
Although both the ExComm in 1962 and critics of the Iraq War in
2002–2003 invoked the “Pearl Harbor in reverse” moral analogy, they were
drawing different parallels with Japanese behavior in 1941, which involved
the launching of a surprise attack for preventive reasons. In 1962 the Ex-
Comm was concerned about the potential immorality of a surprise attack,
whereas in 2002–2003 Arthur Schlesinger and Edward Kennedy focused on
what they deemed the immorality of preventive wars. The U.S. strikes against
Iraq in March 2003 obviously were not a surprise. Indeed, they were one of
the most telegraphed invasions in history. Hence, that aspect of the Pearl Har-
bor analogy never came into play.
Conclusions
This article raises a number of questions. Where did the proponents of the
Pearl Harbor moral analogy locate the source of normative concern: at the in-
dividual, domestic, or international level? Was the analogy primarily used as a
rhetorical device, or was it an independent variable shaping actors’ prefer-
ences? What does the case suggest about the wider use of moral analogies?
Was this an example of the wise use of history?
McElroy argued that morality can inºuence foreign policy via three path-
ways: individual conscience, domestic public opinion, and world opinion.70
During the Cuban missile crisis, the Pearl Harbor moral analogy took the ªrst
and third pathways: individual conscience and world opinion. George Ball,
and later Robert Kennedy, were opposed in principle to surprise attacks simi-
lar to Pearl Harbor. Concern also existed that a surprise attack would produce
global outrage at the United States, with negative consequences for U.S. for-
eign policy. President Kennedy’s views were shaped through both of these
channels. He claimed that a surprise attack would put the United States into
the position of “acting in such a bad way.”71 Kennedy was also sensitive to the
potential deterioration of America’s global image if it launched air strikes
without warning.72 But there is little evidence that he or other policymakers
71
Moral Analogies in the Cuban Missile Crisis
69. “Senator Edward M. Kennedy’s Induction Remarks,” American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 5
October 2002.
70. McElroy, Morality and American Foreign Policy.
71. Stern, Averting the “Final Failure,” p. 107; and May and Zelikow, The Kennedy Tapes, pp. 148–
151.
72. Stern, Averting the “Final Failure,” p. 100.
were worried about the domestic consequences of surprise air strikes. On the
contrary, their main fear at home, as repeatedly expressed in the ExComm,
was that the blockade would be perceived as being too weak a response.73
The Kennedy tapes reveal that the Pearl Harbor moral analogy had a ma-
jor causal impact during the ªrst week of the crisis. By 22 October the air
strike option (especially strikes without any warning) had been branded the
“Pearl Harbor” option. The ethical parallel with Pearl Harbor was repeatedly
invoked in a coherent and consistent manner, and on each occasion it tended
to frame the subsequent discussion. Every time a surprise air strike was com-
pared to the Japanese actions in 1941 the analogy unsettled the ExComm.
Surprisingly, the moral parallel between air strikes and Pearl Harbor was never
openly questioned within the ExComm meetings, even by those whose argu-
ments the analogy undermined (although Dean Acheson did criticize the rele-
vance of Pearl Harbor on at least one occasion outside the ExComm).74 Al-
though the historical parallel was used in part for advocacy and justiªcation,
the evidence strongly suggests that the analogy’s chief exponents, such as Ball,
Robert Kennedy, and John Kennedy, believed in its essential truth. President
Kennedy cited the analogy in the ExComm discussions, in a private conversa-
tion with Dean Acheson, and in a meeting with members of Congress. The
perceived lessons of Pearl Harbor helped policymakers comprehend the moral
nature of the air strike option and the likelihood of subsequent global infamy.
Members of the ExComm exhibited a range of concerns about a surprise at-
tack: the fear of killing Soviet troops or civilians, the irreversibility of an at-
tack, the possibility of escalation, personal guilt, and international repercus-
sions. The Pearl Harbor analogy tied many of these disparate arguments
together into a highly salient formulation. In doing so, the analogy made an
ambiguous moral argument against surprise attacks far more powerful.
The Pearl Harbor moral analogy was crucial in spurring the ExComm to
reject the option of an air strike without warning. Before the introduction of
the Pearl Harbor analogy on Thursday, 18 October, President Kennedy had
been wary of issuing a warning, for fear that Khrushchev might use the op-
portunity to outmaneuver him, threaten Berlin, hide the missiles, or prepare
them for launch. After Ball’s remarks (and McNamara’s claim that the United
States could probably keep track of Soviet missiles after any warning), the
president’s position changed dramatically. He suggested that if the adminis-
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tration issued a warning on Friday (the 19th) before air strikes began on Sat-
urday, this would ensure that “it isn’t Pearl Harbor.”75 A few hours later, Ken-
nedy repeated the Pearl Harbor argument to Dean Acheson. The president
acknowledged the military disadvantages of a warning, but by this point he
was convinced that it was the best policy, and he never again seriously enter-
tained a surprise attack.76
The Pearl Harbor analogy had a far-reaching impact on Robert Kennedy,
whose position underwent a remarkable shift from the cynicism of his “sink
the Maine” comment to his later idealistic moralism. The tapes suggest that
despite his initial bellicosity, he came to accept and internalize the moral par-
allel between air strikes and Pearl Harbor. Robert Kennedy was not a dove
who latched onto the Pearl Harbor analogy merely as a rhetorical device.
Rather, he was a hawk who altered his position largely because of the Pearl
Harbor analogy. Most writers attribute a major role to Robert Kennedy in
shaping the ExComm discussions, especially at the meetings when President
Kennedy was absent (where Robert Kennedy would often be circulating ideas
at his brother’s behest).77 Robert Kennedy’s speech on Friday, 19 October,
played a considerable role in ªrming up the blockade position at a time when
the JCS, Acheson, Bundy and others were mobilizing for an attack on the
missile sites. McNamara later argued that Robert Kennedy’s arguments
against a Pearl Harbor–style strike had been important in swinging the presi-
dent toward the quarantine.78 Douglas Dillon also switched his position to a
large extent because of the Pearl Harbor analogy. McCone, for his part, had
been worried about the “Pearl Harbor” implications of a surprise attack from
the start.79
The impact of the Pearl Harbor moral analogy—ªrst on McCone and
Ball, then on President Kennedy and Robert Kennedy, and later on Dillon,
Rusk, McNamara, and others—suggests that it was a sufªcient condition to
eliminate the option of a surprise air strike. Even in the absence of other fac-
tors, ethical parallels with 1941 would have been enough to prevent a surprise
attack. It is more difªcult to demonstrate that the moral analogy was a neces-
sary condition for the decision to issue a warning (i.e. that in the absence of
the moral analogy, the United States would not have decided to abandon the
surprise attack option). The desire to allow Soviet personnel to evacuate the
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target areas was another factor that might have been sufªcient to avert a sur-
prise attack, with or without the moral analogy.80 Even if no one had men-
tioned Pearl Harbor, the ExComm would have worried about the potential
wider political repercussions of air strikes. On the other hand, if the analogy
had not been invoked, the participants would probably not have drawn such a
stark moral-political line between an air strike with a warning and one with-
out.
If the Pearl Harbor moral analogy was a sufªcient condition to eliminate
the option of a surprise attack, what role did it play in undermining the op-
tion of an air strike with a warning and thereby encouraging the decision for a
blockade? Memories of Pearl Harbor were by no means the only factor that fa-
vored a blockade. President Kennedy raised doubts about the likely success of
air strikes and about possible Soviet responses. As he told the JCS on 19 Oc-
tober, the blockade offered a degree of control, helping to avoid escalation to
nuclear war.81 John Kennedy’s caution and his desire to keep options open, as
well as his willingness to examine how things looked from the other side, were
personal traits largely independent of historical analogies.
Nevertheless, the Pearl Harbor parallel proved to be an important causal
factor in the decision to introduce a blockade. The rejection of a surprise at-
tack placed the next option—an attack preceded by a warning—in the spot-
light. The strategic difªculties attending this course of action in turn pushed
the administration toward the quarantine. Although a surprise U.S. attack
could, at least in theory, have been a surgical strike against the missile sites,
any warning to the Soviet Union would have necessitated a much larger-scale
assault to counter the expected mobilization of Cuban air defenses. President
Kennedy was well aware that the larger the attack became, the greater the risk
of Soviet retaliation. From the start he favored the most limited strike possi-
ble.82 Furthermore, one of the major U.S. concerns was whether an air strike
would destroy all the missile sites. Air strikes after a warning would have of-
fered fewer guarantees in this regard than a surprise attack. Moreover, the
ExComm could only guess what Khrushchev would do in the interim be-
tween a warning and the ªrst sorties. By eliminating the most effective air
strike option in strategic terms—a surgical surprise attack—the Pearl Harbor
analogy played an important causal role in eliminating all air strike options
and thereby facilitating the blockade.83 In the absence of the moral analogy,
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the choice might have come down to a surprise attack versus a blockade, mak-
ing the air strike option much more attractive.
This case supports Yuen Foong Khong’s argument that historical analo-
gies are used not only to justify decisions but also to make them, most notably
in the process of rejecting options (in this case the rejection ªrst of an air
strike without warning and then of an air strike before the blockade). Moral
analogies are intellectual devices that can bring ethical concerns into policy-
making, even when vital national interests are at stake. As discussed earlier,
the effectiveness of a moral analogy depends on a range of variables, including
the clarity or ambiguity of the moral argument, the nature of the foreign pol-
icy issue under question, the similarity between the cases, and the salience of
the analogous example. In the Cuban missile crisis, the moral norm against
surprise attacks was not clear-cut, the high stakes involved in the crisis al-
lowed only a limited role for morality, and the parallels between air strikes
against Cuba and the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor were only superªcial.
Nonetheless, the analogy still mattered; mainly, it appears, because of the ex-
traordinary salience of Pearl Harbor. This ªnding suggests that the key vari-
able shaping the impact of moral analogies is whether they focus on a striking
event such as Pearl Harbor, the Holocaust, or the attacks on the World Trade
Center and Pentagon. Pearl Harbor was still so resonant in 1962 that deci-
sion-makers applied a moral injunction against surprise attacks in the Cuban
missile crisis, even though few if any of them regarded such a ban as a compel-
ling wider ethical principle. To get a sense of the salience of Pearl Harbor in
1962, one can imagine a situation today in which the United States discussed
a policy option that involved exploding an aircraft or targeting a tall building.
The action might be abandoned simply because it bore some slight physical
resemblance to the attacks of 11 September 2001.
Why was the moral analogy with Pearl Harbor more effective as an argu-
ment in 1962 than in 2003? First, Pearl Harbor was a far more resonant case
in 1962. The event remains iconic but is not as salient for policymakers who
were born after 1941. Second, prospective air strikes on Cuba bore some
slight physical resemblance to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, thus mak-
ing the analogy more striking. The invasion of Iraq bore no physical resem-
blance at all to events in 1941, and thus the analogy was purely abstract.
Third, in 1962 the moral analogy referred to the Japanese surprise attack,
whereas in 2002–2003 critics of the Bush administration critics referred to Ja-
pan’s preventive-war motivation. Pearl Harbor is infamous primarily because
it was a surprise or “sneak” attack, not because of Japan’s motivation for
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ªghting. If the Japanese had offered a clear warning or declaration of war be-
fore initiating an explicitly preventive conºict in 1941, the attack on Pearl
Harbor would probably not have achieved the same degree of notoriety.
If, during the Cuban missile crisis, a comparatively weak moral norm
against surprise attacks proved to be remarkably effective because of its associ-
ation with a salient historical case, did this represent a successful use of his-
tory? Were air strikes against Pearl Harbor and Cuba in fact morally analo-
gous?
Ernest May, Richard Neustadt, and Yuen Foong Khong all viewed the
Cuban missile crisis as a positive instance of learning from the past.84 How-
ever, we need to distinguish between the wisdom of a policy promoted by a
particular argument and the strength of the argument itself. President Ken-
nedy made a wise choice in deciding on the quarantine, but the moral parallel
between air strikes against Cuba and Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor was
superªcial at most. In 1941, the Japanese struck ªrst to provoke a wider war
and achieve a dominant imperial position in East Asia. In 1962, the United
States could have claimed a moral case for destroying the missiles with a pro-
portionate attack, given the deceitful manner in which they were placed on
the island, and perhaps also by invoking the Monroe Doctrine. Few interna-
tional observers would have jumped to make the Pearl Harbor moral analogy,
given its relative lack of salience outside the United States. Furthermore, the
notion that countries had to give a formal warning before engaging in hostili-
ties was not a universally accepted moral norm. A limited air strike would
likely have provoked criticism, including from key allies such as Britain, but it
seems far-fetched to suggest that this censure would have paralleled Japanese
infamy.
What created a sense of moral equivalence between the projected air
strikes against Cuba and Pearl Harbor was to a large extent the surface physi-
cal resemblance—in both cases, an attack from the sea with aircraft. Although
the Kennedy brothers had supported aggressive covert actions (including
plots to assassinate Castro) and a sneak attack by Cuban expatriates against
Castro’s regime over the previous eighteen months, these did not physically
look like the handiwork of Tojo. Dean Acheson, whose hawkish preferences
in the Cuban missile crisis might have sparked a disastrous war, nevertheless
had a point in describing the Pearl Harbor parallel as a “thoroughly false and
pejorative analogy.”85 As Ernest May writes, when policymakers use analogies
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they tend to use them badly, failing to “analyze the case, test its ªtness, or even
ask in what ways it might be misleading.”86 Fortunately on this occasion, a
superªcial analogy was internalized by decision-makers and helped to avert
a nuclear exchange that would have been what Kennedy called “the ªnal
failure.”87
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